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SAGAS FOR SUSTAINABILITY? COMMONS, CONFLICT AND 
COOPERATION IN THE SAGAS OF ICELANDERS 
 
¿SAGAS PARA LA SOSTENIBILIDAD? BIENES COMUNES, CONFLICTO Y 




Abstract: Natural resources managed as commons are often discussed following one of two 
opposed narratives: either Garret Hardin’s pessimistic “tragedy of the commons” (assuming 
their inherent unsustainability), or Elinor Ostrom’s optimistic account of the commons as 
resource systems that are sustainable over the long term. This article analyzes stories from the 
medieval sagas of Icelanders in which natural resources managed as commons play an 
important role. In all the examples, these resource systems appear as either vulnerable or 
failing. However, close readings reveal that an interpretation based on Hardin’s “tragic” 
narrative fails to grasp the underlying meaning of these stories. In almost all cases, the sagas 
use various narrative means to characterize in negative ways those who endanger or terminate 
commons. The sagas depict egoistic and aggressive behavior as being wrong and highlight 
modesty and cooperation as an implicit (and sometimes explicit) ideal in the use of commons. 
The frequency and prominence in the sagas of stories that frame commons in this way, 
suggests that these stories had an important function in medieval Icelandic society: the 
promotion of norms, values and behavior that could facilitate long-term sustainability in the 
management of natural resources as commons. 
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Resumen: El estudio de recursos naturales, gestionados como bienes comunes, suele basarse 
en una de estas dos teorías opuestas: la perspectiva pesimista de la tragedia de los (bienes) 
comunes de Garret Hardin, “tragedy of the commons” (asumiendo su insostenibilidad 
inherente), o el argumento optimista de Elinor Ostrom que presenta los bienes comunes como 
sistemas de recursos que a la larga resultan ser sostenibles. Este artículo analiza historias de 
las sagas medievales de los islandeses en los que la gestión comunal de los recursos naturales 
juega un papel relevante. En todos los casos, este sistema se presenta como vulnerable o fallido. 
Sin embargo, una lectura detallada muestra que una interpretación basada en el discurso 
“trágico” de Hardin no es suficiente para entender el verdadero significado de estas historias. 
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En casi todos los casos, las sagas usan distintos métodos narrativos para caracterizar de forma 
negativa a aquellos que ponen en peligro, o acaban con, los bienes comunes. Las sagas 
presentan comportamientos egoístas y agresivos como algo erróneo, y destacan la modestia y 
la cooperación como ideales implícitos (y a veces explícitos) en el uso de los bienes comunes. 
La frecuencia y prominencia en las sagas de historias que enmarcan los bienes comunes de 
este modo sugiere que estas historias tenían una importante función en la sociedad medieval 
islandesa: la de promover normas, valores y conductas que pudieran facilitar la sostenibilidad 
a largo plazo en la gestión de los recursos naturales como bienes comunes. 
 






The stories we tell about the environment affect our interactions with it. This is a 
foundational insight for the emerging field of the environmental humanities. Environmental 
humanities scholars explore how values, meaning-making processes, and not least, narratives 
affect what humans perceive as environmental problems and how they choose to deal with 
these.2 The way storytelling structures human experience of the environment is a central object 
of research in ecocriticism – that is, literary and cultural studies with a focus on environmental 
issues – in particular. Like environmental history, ecocriticism examines “how texts are 
entangled with and address the larger processes by which societies conceptualize and manage 
their environment” (Bergthaller et al., 2014, p. 272).  
Environmental problems such as anthropogenic climate change, mass species extinction, 
and the global degradation of ecosystems have recently led to calls for new stories that may 
help us to respond appropriately to these challenges. As the editors of a recent short-story 
collection on the theme of climate change express it: “We live our lives through stories, and if 
we want to create a thriving, sustainable world, we will need to change our story” (O’Brien et 
al., 2019, p. vi). However, there is no consensus on what kind of stories will be most useful in 
this regard. As ecocritic Ursula Heise notes, there is an ongoing “vigorous debate between 
 
2 For a recent overview of and introduction to the environmental humanities, see Emmett & Nye, 2017. 
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different strains of the environmental movement over what story templates will prove to be 
most effective in the future” (2017, p. 7).  
This focus on a declared need for new narratives tends, however, to overlook how, for a 
long time, humans have in fact used storytelling as a tool to promote sustainability. In this 
article, I argue that many of the stories contained in the medieval sagas of Icelanders 
(Íslendingasögur) are likely to have had such a function regarding the sustainable management 
of a specific type of natural resources: the commons.  
Commons – that is, resources whose use is not restricted to one single party, but which 
have more than one user – have, in the environmental debate of the last 50 years, become 
inextricably linked to questions of sustainability. The starting point was Garrett Hardin’s 
influential essay “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968), in which Hardin assumes that using 
resources as commons will inevitably lead to their degradation and depletion. Other 
researchers, most prominently Elinor Ostrom, have claimed that commons have enormous 
potential for long-term sustainable resource management.  
Environmental historian William Cronon emphasizes that the way in which scholars 
recount human-environment interactions is itself inevitably structured in a narrative way, 
often leading to greatly diverging framings of the same source material (Cronon, 1992). This 
is also the case with Hardin’s and Ostrom’s narrative framings of the commons, which are 
based on two different plots: one with a tragic outcome, the other one with a happy ending.  
This article focuses on source material that itself is obviously narrative. The sagas of 
Icelanders tell many stories about the use of commons in the past – that is, several hundred 
years before the sagas themselves were written down. Yet what kind of stories are these? Do 
commons figure in them as a “tragic” or a sustainable form of resource use? And what social 
function can the sagas’ frequent narrative framing of commons have had in medieval Icelandic 
society?  
To answer these questions, I will first, with Hardin’s and Ostrom’s positions as points of 
departure, outline the controversial contemporary narratives that have been established 
regarding the commons. I will then, against this background, provide close readings of several 
examples from the sagas where commons play an important role, and analyze these based on 
the above questions.  
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Hardin’s and Ostrom’s Narratives of the Commons 
 
Hardin published his essay “The Tragedy of the Commons” in the journal Science in 
1968. Although his actual interest is the question of human population growth, his most 
prominent example used to illustrate the unsustainability of the commons is “a pasture open 
to all” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244). He argues that, since “[a]s a rational being, every herdsman 
seeks to maximize his gain” (p. 1244), everybody will keep as many animals on that pasture 
as possible. Consequently, the pasture will degrade due to overgrazing, and in the end, it will 
inevitably be destroyed: “the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy” 
(p. 1244). According to Hardin, therefore, “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (p. 
1244). In Hardin’s eyes, appeals to individual consciousness and moderation in the use of 
commons are futile, since no one wants to be a fool who refrains from taking short-term 
advantage while others do not exercise the same restraint. The only solutions Hardin sees are 
therefore to turn commons into private property with mechanisms for legal inheritance, 
despite the injustice that it would necessarily involve, or to introduce public coercion that 
would enforce changed behavior.  
Hardin’s argument that commons will necessarily be ruined through overuse and that 
managing commons sustainably is impossible has been highly influential (cf. Daniels, 2019, p. 
93), even though Hardin’s essay is not based on any research on existing or former commons. 
This is one of the points of criticism brought forward against Hardin by Elinor Ostrom in her 
study Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990). Ostrom 
argues that neither state ownership nor private property have historically proven to be more 
efficient forms of managing natural resources than commons, and that indeed nationalization 
and privatization often have been detrimental to the long-term maintenance of resource 
systems. According to Ostrom, the main problem with Hardin’s approach to the commons is 
the implied assumption that the users of natural resources are not capable of communicating 
with each other and of creating and changing rules, and that thus external intervention would 
always be necessary in order to prevent a negative outcome.  
In her study of the commons, Ostrom uses the term “common pool resource” (CPR) for 
“a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not 
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impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use”, and calls 
those who withdraw “resource units” from such a system “appropriators” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 
30). She argues that there are many examples of CPRs – such as forests, irrigation systems, 
inshore fisheries, pastures, and hunting grounds – that have been managed successfully and 
preserved over long periods of time, often many hundreds of years. Analyzing specific cases 
of successful, still existing commons, some of which can be traced back at least to the Middle 
Ages, Ostrom finds that these were not “open to all” as assumed by Hardin. Indeed, access to, 
for example, mountain pastures in Törbel in Switzerland was restricted to citizens of the 
municipality, and there were detailed rules regulating who could graze animals, how many 
they could graze, and during which periods of time. Through such protection from 
overgrazing, the mountain pastures’ productivity had been not only maintained, but even 
improved, for example, through weeding and manuring (p. 63-64). Ostrom finds similar 
results for other types of CPRs in places as varied as Japan, the Philippines and Spain. 
According to Ostrom, their “most notable similarity [...] is the sheer perseverance manifested 
in these resource systems and institutions. The resource systems clearly meet the criterion of 
sustainability” (p. 89). 
Ostrom admits that Hardin’s assumptions may be “useful for predicting behavior in 
large-scale CPRs in which no one communicates, everyone acts independently, no attention is 
paid to the effects of one’s actions, and the costs of trying to change the structure of the 
situation are high” (p. 183). She even concedes that there is an “ever present temptation to free-
ride” (p. 32) in all kinds of CPRs and discusses several cases of failed or failing and therefore 
unsustainable CPRs. Yet her main point is that the “tragedy of the commons” is not inevitable, 
and that long-term sustainability is indeed possible.  
It can be said that, while Hardin’s basic premise is that humans are egoistic, competitive 
and focused on short-term profit, Ostrom assumes humans to be cooperative and to be capable 
of acting together for their own and others’ benefit in a long-term perspective. These 
assumptions result in two opposed narratives: a pessimistic one, in which commons 
necessarily result in a (socio-)ecological catastrophe, and an optimistic one, in which commons 
can not only be sustained in a long-term perspective, but even potentially yield greater benefits 
than other forms of resource use. I will, in the following sections, analyze to what extent 
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elements of these two narratives also shape the stories about commons featured in the sagas 
of Icelanders. I will mainly apply Ostrom’s analytical terminology in my analysis (with terms 
such as “resource units” and “appropriators”), since it is more specific than Hardin’s and thus 
better suited to discussing a variety of relevant details regarding the sagas’ narrative framing 
of CPRs.  
 
The Commons in the Sagas 
 
The sagas of Icelanders were written in pre-modern Iceland, mainly during the 13th and 
14th centuries. However, the stories told in them are mostly set in the 9th to 11th centuries, and 
thus in the period during which Iceland was settled and Icelandic society emerged and 
developed. This was primarily a farming society, and almost all the main characters in the 
sagas are farmers (cf. Byock, 2001, p. 23). This entails that the texts also contain a wealth of 
references to agriculture-related resources and activities, to an extent that is unique in 
medieval European literature. 
CPRs figure in the sagas in many forms, such as mountain pastures, beaches, fisheries, 
grain fields, hay meadows, and forests. It is not possible here to discuss all of the numerous 
mentions of CPRs in the sagas, and I will therefore have to limit my analysis to cases that are 
especially significant and narrated in sufficient detail to be instructive with regard to the above 
research questions. It is also important to note that, while the sagas most often refer to real 
places and some of the CPRs mentioned in them indeed can be identified in Iceland, the actual 
past existence of these CPRs is not crucial for my argument. My focus is not on the sagas’ 
historical accuracy in their accounts of CPR use, but on the underlying narratives and their 
implications.  
These implications, or a kind of “message” concerning CPR use conveyed in these 
stories, may not necessarily be expressed in a direct way. The sagas of Icelanders are known 
for their seemingly objective style of narration (cf. Vésteinn Ólason, 2005, p. 105-106). Usually, 
focalization is limited to an external perspective, with the narrator not having insight into 
characters’ thoughts and feelings. The narrator often quotes oral sources and tends (in most 
texts) to refrain from any explicit judgement or explanatory comments. However, as Lars 
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Lönnroth notes, “each saga also manages to convey the idea that certain ethical norms exist, 
against which characters as well as actions can be measured” (1970, p. 157). Preben 
Meulengracht Sørensen likewise argues that the sagas put their audiences in the position of 
judges evaluating the narrated events, with the texts providing various clues for which norms 
are to be considered as valid in this regard (1993, p. 210-211). The sagas convey such norms, 
for example, through the way they introduce characters, which often involves rather explicit 
judgements, making it possible for the audience to classify a character and to develop certain 
expectations as to his or her behavior. Another way norms are conveyed is through references 
to public opinion concerning a character or this character’s actions, or judgements uttered by 
other characters (usually in the form of direct speech). While according to Lönnroth, the 
quoted public opinion and the narrator’s own views usually are identical (1970, p. 170), Joanne 
Shortt Butler argues that there are cases where these do not match, especially in some of the 
outlaw sagas where the “hero” is showing socially aberrant behavior condemned by the 
public, but still has the sympathy of the narrator (Butler, 2019). Overall, however, it is usually 
possible to clearly discern whose behavior is to be appreciated, and whose is to be condemned, 
and thus what sort of moral is to be deduced from the story.  
It is therefore important to focus not only on plot, but also on the specific combination 
of characters with a particular type of setting (a CPR) in the stories that the sagas tell about the 
use of commons. It is this combination of plot, character and setting that makes it possible to 
draw conclusions about an intended interpretation of these stories’ framing of the 




The sagas feature basically two types of CPRs: those that appear as vulnerable, and those 
that fail. In the following, I will first discuss examples of CPRs that are threatened, but that do 
not (or not plainly) cease to exist as commons, and that thus can be categorized as vulnerable. 
 
The common mountain pasture in Hávarðar saga Ísfirðings 
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Just as Hardin’s essay, with its prominent example of a “pasture open to all” (Hardin, 
1968, p. 1244), the sagas feature stories in which jointly used pastures figure as motifs. This 
means in most cases mountain pastures, called afréttir, which are historically documented to 
have existed in many parts of Iceland. Sheep and horses were driven up to afréttir in spring 
and down again in autumn. However, the afréttir were clearly not “open to all”; to the contrary, 
detailed legal provisions existed, regulating among other things the number of sheep and the 
length of the grazing period (cf. Thráinn Eggertsson, 1992).  
Heiðarvíga saga tells not only how rules are set requiring every farmer to mark his 
livestock in an unambiguous way, but also how a local chieftain takes up the task of 
monitoring adherence to these rules and rigorously sanctions their transgression (cf. Heiðarvíga 
saga 226-229). Another aspect in which the afréttir in the sagas differ from Hardin’s pasture 
(and rather resemble Ostrom’s examples) is that they do not end in “ruin”. There is no 
indication in any saga of overgrazing and subsequent degradation of vegetation and soil.3 Yet 
while ecological degradation in the sagas never appears as a threat to these CPRs, an issue not 
considered by Hardin but acknowledged by Ostrom does: that of free riders withdrawing 
resource units from the CPR although they don’t have a legal right to them. Heiðarvíga saga, 
for example, mentions that the original impetus for developing the earmark system was that 
people suspected outlaws or neighbors of stealing animals from the afréttir (226).  
Hávarðar saga Ísfirðings also mentions the problem of finding all the animals, since these 
are spread over a wide area. When, one fall, people are missing many of their sheep from the 
mountain pastures, a young man, Óláfr Hávarðsson, searches the mountains on his own 
initiative, finds many of the animals and returns them to their respective owners. He does so 
even in the following two years. However, a local goði, Þorbjǫrn, believes that when Óláfr 
comes to his farm with the missing animals, he is starting a relationship with Þorbjǫrn’s 
housekeeper Sigríðr. Þorbjǫrn, not willing to tolerate this, assaults Óláfr and kills him (cf. 
Hávarðar saga Ísfirðings 294-307).  
 
3 Soil erosion, although constituting a considerable problem already in Viking Age Iceland, barely ever 
figures as a motif in the sagas (cf. Hennig, 2019, pp. 332–334). 
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While this story gives an idea of the difficulty of monitoring a CPR stretched out over a 
wide area, it can hardly serve as an example of Hardin’s tragedy. The pasture is obviously not 
“open to all”, but only to the local community of farmers, and it is not destroyed by overuse. 
It thus shows more similarity with Ostrom’s examples of CPRs. However, the saga makes clear 
what is to be considered appropriate or inappropriate behavior in the use of common 
mountain pastures. Óláfr, with his unselfish helpfulness, seems very much to function as a 
role model. He is described as “manna gørviligastr” (Hávarðar saga Ísfirðings 292) [“the most 
capable man”] and as “inn efniligasti maðr” (304) [“the most talented man”].4 He is a prime 
example of good cooperation, working for the common good of all users of the CPR. The 
narrator states twice that Óláfr becomes very “vinsæll” (295 and 296) [“popular”] because of 
this. Þorbjǫrn, on the other hand, is exclusively characterized in negative ways in the saga. He 
is “inn mesti ójafnaðarmaðr” (291) [“the most overbearing man”], he shows “ódrengskap” 
(300) [“meanness”] in dealings with his neighbors, and one character calls it a “skǫmm” (306) 
[“shame”] that Þorbjǫrn (having two supporters with him) uses superior numbers to overcome 
Óláfr. The saga thus barely leaves any doubt that Óláfr’s example is the one to be imitated, 
while behavior such as Þorbjǫrn‘s is to be rejected. Not egoism and conflict, but cooperation, 
is showcased as a social ideal in the use of a pasture CPR.  
 
The Almenningar eystri in Fóstbrœðra saga 
 
Another CPR of considerable size are the Almenningar eystri in the Strandir region, an 
area where people from this quarter of the country had the right to exploit stranded whales 
and other resources during a certain period of the year. In Fóstbrœðra saga, the sworn brothers 
Þorgeirr and Þormóðr frequently travel there to provision themselves. Þorgeirr, hearing that 
a man called Þorgils Máksson has found a whale and is cutting it, confronts Þorgils and 
demands a share of the whale. When Þorgeirr finds a compromise suggested by Þorgils not 
acceptable, he kills Þorgils in a fight and takes the entire whale for himself. As a result, Þorgeirr 
becomes outlawed (cf. Fóstbrœðra saga 147-149). 
 
4 All translations in this article are my own. 
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It may appear as if the free availability of resources on the Almenningar fuels the egoism 
of the two parties involved here. With each of them wanting to withdraw as many resource 
units as possible, conflict becomes inevitable. Yet such a Hardin-based reading overlooks that 
clear rules for the use of the Almenningar, including the appropriation of stranded whales, are 
stipulated in law codes such as Grágás (186-187). Even though in the case of the Almenningar 
the number of those with use rights is high, it is not unlimited: the beaches there are not “open 
to all” as the pasture pictured by Hardin is, but only to inhabitants of the quarter. Þorgeirr, 
who doesn’t have a permanent residence there, thus has a rather dubious claim to the whale.5 
Also, while the narrator presents Þorgils Máksson as “góðr búþegn” (148) [“a good 
farmer”], Þorgeirr appears as a more ambivalent character in the saga. While the narrator 
clearly admires Þorgeirr’s courage (cf. Fóstbrœðra saga 128, 133, and 208), there can be no doubt 
that much of what Þorgeirr does is considered wrong by his contemporaries. Þorgeirr and 
Þormóðr “váru eigi vinsælir, tǫlðu margir þá ekki vera jafnaðarmenn” (125) [“were not 
popular; many people said they were not fair men”]. During their repeated trips to the 
Almenningar, they cause “mikil óhœgendi” (134-135) [“a lot of trouble”] for many people: 
“Hafa þeir þat af hverjum manni, sem þeir kveðja” (142) [“they take from everyone what they 
want”] and “váru þar allir menn hræddir við þá” (149) [“everyone there was afraid of them”].  
It is therefore clear that the sworn brothers’ behavior is not in accordance with the social 
(and legal) norms of their time. While they are the main characters of the saga and thus are 
described with some sympathy by the narrator, their actions on the Almenningar are not 
meant to be imitated. In Þorgeirr’s case, they even lead to him being outlawed and (indirectly) 
to his violent death sometime later. Þorgils (although described in much less detail) appears 
as the opposite of the troublemaker Þorgeirr, and his willingness to compromise and to share 
the resources on the Almenningar appears better suited to providing a role model. Thus, while 
the CPR in question is vulnerable regarding potential conflict, the saga implies cooperation as 
an ideal for its use. 
  
The fishing place Bjarneyjar in Laxdœla saga 
 
5 In Grettis saga, which describes the court case in more detail, this argument is used against Þorgeirr; 
cf. Grettis saga Ásmundarsonar 93. 
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Laxdœla saga contains a rare example of a large-scale commons that indeed seems to fulfill 
Hardin’s criterium of being open to all – the archipelago of Bjarneyjar in Breiðafjǫrðr:  
 
“þær eyjar eru margar saman ok váru mjǫk gagnauðgar. Í þann tíma sóttu menn þangat mjǫk 
til veiðifangs; var ok þar fjǫlmennt mjǫk ǫllum missarum. Mikit þótti spǫkum mǫnnum undir 
því, at menn ætti gott saman í útverjum; var þat þá mælt, at mǫnnum yrði ógæfra um 
veiðifang, ef missáttir yrði; gáfu ok flestir menn at því góðan gaum.” (29)  
 
[“these are many islands and they were very productive. At that time, people drew there a lot 
for fishing. There were many people there every year. Wise men considered it very important 
that people cooperated well in outlying fishing places. It was said at that time that people 
would be less fortunate regarding catches if discord arose. Most people complied well with 
that.”]  
  
In the saga, Hallr, the brother of a local chieftain, travels there for fishing. He shares a 
boat with another man, Þórólfr. One evening, when they are to divide the catch, Hallr tries to 
defraud Þórólfr, justifying this with his higher social position. Þórólfr is forced to withdraw, 
while Hallr takes the entire catch for himself. A short time later, Þórólfr takes revenge on Hallr 
by killing him (cf. Laxdœla saga 28-30).  
A Hardin-based reading might argue that the status of the fishing grounds as a CPR 
necessarily fuels Hallr’s egoism and greed. However, based on Ostrom, one might object that 
even in this CPR from which, it seems, everyone with a boat can freely appropriate resources, 
rules exist. These rules prescribe cooperation and the avoidance of conflict and are justified by 
the belief that discord would lead to reduced yields from the CPR, possibly even its 
devastation. It is not clear from the saga if the conflict between Hallr and Þórólfr indeed results 
in a degradation of the CPR, even though the use of the past tense in the description of the 
islands’ productivity may indicate such an outcome.  
What is quite clear, however, is that Hallr is described as acting in the wrong way. On 
the one hand, he breaks the social contract pertaining to all users of the CPR. On the other 
hand, he generally appears as a problematic character in the saga. The narrator states that most 
people judged Hallr not to be a “nytjungr” (Laxdœla saga 28) [“useful man”] and he is shown 
to behave in a markedly arrogant way. Hallr appears thus as an unlikeable person, who is 
doing the opposite of what the social norms for the use of the fishing place prescribe: he 
chooses conflict, instead of the cooperation that is expected from everyone appropriating 
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resources from the CPR. Had he behaved according to the rules, neither the common fishing 
grounds nor his own life would have been endangered. 
 
The forest in Njáls saga 
 
A CPR that is much smaller than in the previous examples plays an important role in 
Njáls saga. Two of the saga’s main characters, Njáll and Gunnarr, share a forest which is 
described in the following way: “Þeir áttu skóg saman Gunnarr ok Njáll í Rauðaskriðum; þeir 
hǫfðu ekki skipt skóginum, en hvárr var vanr at hǫggva sem þurfti, ok talði hvárrgi á annan 
of þat” (Brennu-Njáls saga 92) [“Gunnar and Njáll owned a forest together at Rauðaskriður. 
They had not parceled out the forest, and both used to cut down trees as needed and none of 
them reproached the other for it”].  
The starting situation is thus a CPR with use rights restricted to two parties, Gunnarr 
and Njáll, but without any internal rules for resource withdrawal. Cooperation in the use of 
the CPR nevertheless works well, because it is based on Gunnarr’s and Njáll’s long-lasting 
friendship and mutual trust. Cooperation and self-restraint are obviously pre-supposed by 
both sides, making any overuse and subsequent degradation of the forest unlikely, since 
neither of the two parties using the CPR would act purely egoistically.  
However, conditions change with the growing hostility between Gunnarr’s wife 
Hallgerðr and Njáll’s wife Bergþóra. Only a few months after a first (purely verbal) quarrel 
between the two women, and while both men are away at the Alþingi, Hallgerðr gets to know 
that Bergþóra has sent a farm hand, Svartr, to the forest to spend a week there and cut down 
trees for her. Hallgerðr exclaims that Bergþóra plans “at ræna mik mǫrgu” (93) [“to deprive 
me of much”] and has her overseer Kolr kill Svartr. Even though this has no negative impact 
on the friendship between Gunnarr and Njáll, it is, in the saga, the first act of actual, physical 
violence in a thenceforward escalating conflict that culminates in the killing of Gunnarr and 
the burning of Njáll and his family in their house. In this way, a disagreement about the use 
of a CPR stands at the beginning of one of the longest and bloodiest feuds in medieval Icelandic 
literature. 
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It is possible to read the story about the woodland in terms of Hardin’s tragedy of the 
commons. Hallgerðr assumes that Bergþóra is withdrawing too many resource units from the 
woodland than is possible if this principally renewable resource is to be sustained over time. 
Thus, her own chances of appropriating resource units from the CPR would be negatively 
affected in the future. The average rate of replenishment, at least as Hallgerðr assesses the 
situation, is exceeded, and Hallgerðr as the other user of the CPR will be disadvantaged if she 
doesn’t take as many resource units out of the system as Bergþóra does. Following Hardin, 
Hallgerðr, acting rationally (that is, egoistically), would likewise have to start overexploitation 
of the forest in order to not be disadvantaged and fooled, and the final devastation of the forest 
and thus a tragedy of the commons would be the inevitable result. Hallgerðr, however, decides 
instead to stop Bergþóra‘s withdrawal of resource units through having Svartr killed. It is not 
clear from the saga how the forest is used later on and whether it is ruined by overuse. Neither 
is there any indication of whether Bergþóra´s appropriation of wood via Svartr indeed 
constitutes an unsustainable use, transgressing the previous amount of resource units 
withdrawn from the CPR, or if this is only the biased opinion of Hallgerðr. The forest thus 
certainly constitutes a vulnerable CPR, but not necessarily a failed one.  
In a reading based on Ostrom, the actual problem is that the two parties with use rights 
to the CPR haven’t set any rules for the appropriation of resource units from the forest, making 
any assessment of the right or sustainable amount to be withdrawn by either side difficult if 
not impossible. Had there been clear rules (and a monitoring system) in place, the conflict (and 
possibly even the subsequent acts of violence) could have been avoided. 
However, a close reading of the saga indicates that neither of these two interpretations 
conforms with the actual message behind the story of this resource conflict. Hallgerðr is 
frequently described in negative ways, both by the narrator and by other characters in the 
saga, especially by her uncle Hrútr. She is “skaphǫrð” (29; “hǫrð í skapi”, 31) [“harsh of 
mood”], “blandin mjǫk” (86) [“of dubious character”] and full of “ofmetnað” (31) [“pride”]. 
She is also responsible for the murder of her first husband. When Njáll learns of Gunnarr’s 
engagement to Hallgerðr, he predicts that she will cause “allt it illa” (87) [“everything bad”]. 
Even when Hallgerðr is still a child, Hrútr (who tends to make prophesies that come true) 
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states that she has “þjófsaugu” (7) [“a thief’s eyes”],6 which puts her accusations against 
Bergþóra into a dubious light: she, herself being considered a thief, complains about theft of 
wood, although the absence of rules for resource withdrawal from the forest doesn’t allow for 
such a classification. In addition, Kolr, whom Hallgerðr instructs to murder Svartr, is called 
“it mesta illmenni” (92 and 93) [“the worst villain”] both by herself and by the narrator, casting 
what he does on behalf of Hallgerðr in an even more negative light. Hallgerðr’s escalation of 
the conflict thus clearly appears as wrong, even though Bergþóra also seems to bear some 
responsibility for the dispute about use of the CPR. Bergþóra is introduced in the saga in more 
positive terms as “kvenskǫrungr mikill ok drengr góðr” (57) [“an excellent and good-hearted 
woman”], but she is, just as Hallgerðr, also called “skaphǫrð” (57) [“harsh of mood”]. It is also 
Bergþóra who first offends Hallgerðr and thus causes the enmity between the two women (cf. 
Brennu-Njáls saga 91).  
This readiness of the two women to engage in conflict stands in notable contrast with 
the qualities embodied by Gunnarr and Njáll. Gunnarr is, among other positive attributes, 
called “stilltr vel, vinfastr ok vinavandr” (53) [“self-controlled, faithful to friends and choosing 
his friends carefully”], while Njáll is “vitr [...], heilráðr ok góðgjarn, [...] hógværr ok 
drenglyndr, langsýnn ok langminnigr; hann leysti hvers manns vandræði, er á hans fund 
kom” (57) [“wise [...], offering good advice, full of good intentions [...], sociable, noble-minded 
[...] and he resolved the problems of everyone who went to see him”]. These characteristics are 
what enable the two friends to manage the forest together as a CPR. Their conflict-free 
cooperation appears in the saga as an ideal and thus as a model for imitation, while the 
behavior of Hallgerðr and Bergþóra not only risks the future of the CPR, but also clearly 




6 Cf. Lönnroth, 1970, p. 168. 
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Besides CPRs that appear as threatened and thus vulnerable, there are also numerous 
examples in the sagas of CPRs that indeed fail. These include not only cases where the resource 
system in question is destroyed by unsustainable use, but also cases where a CPR is 
transformed into private property and thus ceases to be managed as a CPR.  
 
The forest in Vápnfirðinga saga 
 
While in Njáls saga, the later fate of Gunnarr’s and Njáll’s forest remains unclear, 
Vápnfirðinga saga tells about a forest CPR that clearly fails. Two neighbors, Þórðr and Þormóðr, 
“áttu skóg saman, ok skilði þá á um skógarhǫggit [...], ok þóttisk Þórðr mjǫk vanhaldinn fyrir 
Þormóði” (Vápnfirðinga saga 38) [“owned a forest together, but they were in disagreement with 
each other about the felling of trees [...] and Þórðr reckoned himself to be greatly 
disadvantaged by Þormóðr”]. Þórðr asks the chieftain Brodd-Helgi for support, but in return, 
Helgi demands that the right to inherit Þórðr’s property is transferred to him, which Þórðr 
agrees to. Soon after, Helgi and his men “hjuggu upp allan skóginn ok drógu hvert tré heim 
til Hofs” (39) [“cut down the entire forest and drew all the trunks home to Hof”], which is 
Helgi’s farmstead. Þormóðr, who is a þingmaðr of another chieftain, Geitir, complains to the 
latter about this “ójǫfnuðr” (39) [“injustice”], but is killed by Helgi when he attempts to bring 
the case to court (cf. Vápnfirðinga saga 38-41) 
In a superficial reading, one might argue that this is a case of a tragedy of the commons. 
Þórðr first thinks that Þormóðr is acting egoistically and withdrawing too many resource units 
from the CPR, and then Helgi acts egoistically to pre-empt any action from the other side. He 
withdraws all resource units and thus destroys the entire CPR. However, the forest here is, 
unlike Hardin’s pasture, not “open to all”: its use is restricted to Þórðr and Þormóðr. That 
Helgi, taking over Þórðr’s use right, appropriates all the wood from the forest, is clearly a 
violation of existing rules.   
The saga does not in any way indicate whether Þórðr’s complaint about Þormóðr is 
justified. However, Helgi’s characterization in the saga makes it clear that he acts in the wrong 
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way when destroying the CPR. While Helgi, as a young man, acquires popularity in the region 
through the killing of an outlaw, the narrator introduces him also as being “ódæll ok óvægr” 
(23) [“quarrelsome and relentless”] and as “margbreytinn” (23) [“capricious”]. The outlaw 
killed by Helgi has cursed him, and it seems that the curse is taking effect when Helgi spoils 
his initially very close friendship with Geitir due to disputes over financial matters. One 
character in the saga also calls Helgi “stórlátr ok féfjarn” (29) [“overbearing and greedy”]. His 
hostility against Geitir is Helgi’s actual motivation for devastating the forest and killing 
Þormóðr, actions that contribute to changing Helgi’s reputation from one of being popular to 
one of being considered “ójafnaðarmaðr mikill” (47) [“a very overbearing man”], not only by 
Geitir’s þingmenn but also by others in the wider region. Geitir, on the other hand, is never 
described in such negative terms; the only way in which the narrator characterizes him is as 
“spekingr mikill” (28) [“a very wise man”]. The destruction of the forest therefore appears in 
the saga not as an inevitable result of its status as a CPR, but rather of Helgi’s unjust behavior. 
The main mistake regarding the forest seems to be that Þórðr involves Helgi in the dispute 
with Þormóðr, which leads to a situation where everyone loses (even Helgi, since the conflict 
in the long run results in his own death). A more likely message that can be read from this 
story than the inevitability of the tragedy of the commons is therefore the importance of good 
cooperation in the management of a CPR and the avoidance of involving external parties, who 
may have other interests than sustaining the CPR.7  
 
The barley field in Víga-Glúms saga 
 
A similar case can be found in Víga-Glúms saga, which tells how, through inheritance, 
landed property at Þverá is divided up between two families, the one represented mainly by 
Ástríðr and her son Glúmr, and the other by Þorkell inn hávi and his son Sigmundr. The 
property includes a barley field that, through this division, is transformed into a CPR: “En þau 
gœði fylgðu mest Þverárlandi, þat var akr, er kallaðr var Vitazgjafi, því at hann varð aldregi 
 
7 Another failed forest CPR is Goðaskógr in Ǫlkofra þáttr. This forest, jointly owned and used by six goðar, 
is, however, destroyed not by overuse, but through an accident (a fire in a neighboring forest that gets 
out of control). 
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ófrær; en honum hafði svá skipt verit með landinu, at sitt sumar hǫfðu hvárir” (Víga-Glúms 
saga 22) [“The most important good belonging to the land at Þverá was a field which was called 
Vitazgjafi because it was never barren. The field had become divided such that each side had 
it every second summer”].  
While Glúmr is abroad in Norway, Þorkell and Sigmundr accuse some of Ástríðr’s slaves 
of having stolen two of their heifers and seize Vitazgjafi as a compensation. When it turns out 
that the heifers had died in a landslide, Þorkell and Sigmundr try to buy the field from Ástríðr, 
which she rejects. In the year Glúmr returns from Norway, Ástríðr would normally have the 
use right to Vitazgjafi; however, in the fall, Sigmundr and his wife Vigdís start reaping the 
field. When Glúmr comes to Vitazgjafi, he kills Sigmundr there. In the following court case, 
Glúmr argues that Sigmundr had been stealing from him and that he was killed on Glúmr’s 
property, and thus there should be no penance. In addition, Glúmr invokes the earlier false 
accusations against Ástríðr. Glúmr wins the case, and Þorkell has to sell him his part of the 
land at Þverá below value to avoid being outlawed.8 The CPR is thus re-transformed into 
private property (cf. Víga-Glúms saga 22-34). 
Based on Hardin, this case could be interpreted as a tragedy of the commons: Vitazgjafi 
fails as a CPR because of the egoism of at least one of the parties involved, and the only solution 
is privatization. However, an Ostrom-based reading would emphasize that Vitazgjafi is not 
“open to all” and that clear rules for its use exist among the rights holders. The problem is that 
one side doesn’t adhere to these rules and tries to appropriate resource units also in a year 
when they have no right to them, as is also confirmed in the court case.  
The latter reading is subtly supported by the narrator, who in his recounting of the 
conflict almost exclusively focalizes Glúmr and Ástríðr, who consider Þorkell’s and 
Sigmundr’s behavior to be “ójafnað” (20) [“injustice”] and “rangendi” (23) [“wrongness”]. The 
narrator even lets a relative of Þórarinn confirm that the killing of Sigmundr was a to be 
expected consequence of the “ójafnað” (30) [“injustice”] that Þorkell and Sigmundr had shown 
against Ástríðr and Glúmr. In this way, the failure of Vitazgjafi as a CPR is attributed neither 
 
8 The saga doesn’t mention Vitazgjafi again after this, but Anne Holtsmark speculates that it may be 
implied that it becomes barren due to the act of killing on a field that was associated with the fertility 
god Freyr (Holtsmark, 1933, p. 130).  
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to a logic of tragedy inherent to this form of resource management, nor to a lack of rules. What 
leads to this outcome is rather the decision by one of the parties involved to introduce conflict 
and competition instead of cooperation.  
 
The hay meadows in Hávarðar saga Ísfirðings and Eyrbyggja saga 
 
Hávarðar saga Ísfirðings tells about a similar small-scale CPR, in this case an irrigated hay 
meadow owned by two neighbors, Ljótr and Þorbjǫrn. Each party has the right to use the 
meadow every second year. However, Ljótr controls the brook that is used to water the 
meadow (and which is equipped with dams), and he blocks Þorbjǫrn’s access to the water in 
the years when it is Þorbjǫrn’s turn to benefit from the meadow. In the end, Þorbjǫrn sees 
himself forced to buy the meadow from Ljótr for a huge sum in order to have any use of it at 
all (cf. Hávarðar saga Ísfirðings 336-337).  
In this way, the meadow ceases to be a CPR, and becomes Þorbjǫrn’s private property. 
It could therefore be regarded as an example of a failed commons according to Hardin, even 
though it shows no ecological degradation. An Ostrom-based reading would emphasize that 
the meadow is not “open to all”, that rules for its use existed, and that the failure is due to one 
of the involved parties not abiding by these rules. 
The narration rather underpins this latter reading. Ljótr is introduced as “inn mesti 
ójafnaðarmaðr” (Hávarðar saga Ísfirðings 336) [“the most overbearing man”] and as “óvinsæll” 
(341) [“unpopular”], and when people learn about the forced purchase, they regard it as “inn 
mesti ójafnaðr” (337) [“the greatest injustice”]. Privatization of the CPR thus appears here not 
as a desirable or even necessary outcome, but as something that could have been avoided, had 
Ljótr acted in accordance with the existing rules. Ljótr’s inclination towards conflict instead of 
cooperation is obviously not an implied role model here. It also has negative consequences for 
Ljótr himself, since he is killed soon after by Þorbjǫrn’s sons, who were not content with the 
forced purchase. 
Eyrbyggja saga mentions a similar hay meadow located on a ridge and jointly owned and 
used by two neighbors, Þórólfr bægifótr and Úlfarr. One day, when both sides have a lot of 
dried hay up on the ridge, Þórólfr orders his slaves to take Úlfarr’s hay. In the conflict that 
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follows, Úlfarr sees no other option than to transfer his property to the goði Arnkell for 
protection against Þórólfr. Since Arnkell is Þórólfr’s son and heir, after Úlfarr’s and Þórólfr’s 
deaths the entire hay meadow becomes Arnkell‘s private property, and thus ceases to be a 
CPR. 
In a Hardin-based reading, the conflict and the final failure of the meadow as a CPR are 
inevitable, since Þórólfr, acting rationally and thus egoistically, tries to withdraw as many 
resource units as possible, leading necessarily to conflict with the other party involved. Based 
on Ostrom, one could argue that the problem rather seems to be an absence of clear rules 
governing the amount of hay each party is allowed to harvest, even though the CPR clearly is 
not “open to all”. It seems, however, that at least once the hay is put up in haystacks, it has to 
be considered as belonging to the party that harvested it, which means that Úlfarr is right in 
accusing Þórólfr of theft (cf. Eyrbyggja saga 82), and what actually happens is that Þórólfr 
breaks existing rules.  
This latter reading is confirmed by Þórólfr’s characterization – he is consistently 
described as an evil person. The narrator calls him “inn mesti ójafnaðarmaðr” (Eyrbyggja saga 
14) [“the most overbearing man”], “illr ok æfr [...] ok mjǫk ójafnaðarfullr” (81) [“evil and fiery 
[...] and very much full of injustice”]. Even according to his own son Arnkell, Þórólfr’s is 
characterized by “illgirni” (91) [“malevolence”]. The narrator describes Úlfarr, on the other 
hand, as a good farmer, and Úlfarr appears as friendly and helpful when Þórólfr once asks 
him for advice. There can thus be little doubt that the narration suggests an interpretation of 
Þórólfr’s egoistic and conflict-laden behavior as wrong, while Úlfarr’s readiness to help and 
cooperate figures as a norm for the use of a CPR. The failure of the meadow as a CPR is 
therefore not to be understood as an inevitable “tragedy” or the result of an absence of rules, 
but of Þórólfr’s inappropriate and antisocial behavior.  
 
The beach in Grettis saga 
 
Grettis saga tells about a conflict concerning flotsam from a beach used as a CPR. Grettir’s 
great-grandfather Ǫnundr tréfótr arrives in the Strandir region of Northern Iceland, when 
most of the land there is already taken. Yet he receives land from the landnámsmáðr Eiríkr 
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snara: “Síðan gaf Eiríkr honum Veiðileysu alla ok Reykjarfjǫrð ok Reykjanes allt út þeim 
megin; en um rekann var ekki skilit, því at þeir váru svá nógir þá, at hverr hafði þat, er vildi” 
(Grettis saga Ásmundarsonar 23) [“then Eiríkr gave him the entire Veiðileysa and Reykjarfjǫrðr 
and all of Reykjanes on that side. But the rights to flotsam were not divided, since it was so 
abundant then that everybody could take that what he wanted”]. In this way, a CPR is 
established, yet given the abundance of resources, no rules are put in place for the 
appropriators involved. 
The narrator states that there were no problems at first, but after the deaths of Eiríkr and 
Ǫnundr, Eiríkr’s son Flosi disputes the right of Ǫnundr’s descendants to the land that Eiríkr 
had given Ǫnundr. The conflict between the two sides is augmented by a decrease of the initial 
abundance of natural resources in the region, causing famine. When during this time a whale 
is washed ashore on Reykjanes, both Flosi and Þorgrímr hærukollr, one of Ǫnundr’s sons, 
make a claim to it, with Flosi contesting Þorgrímr’s right to flotsam from the beach. A fight 
starts, and in the end, several men are dead or wounded.  
In the ensuing court case, the decision is left to the lawspeaker Þorkell máni, who argues 
that Ǫnundr should have paid Eiríkr at least a symbolic sum for the land he received from him, 
so as to make his own claim to the land undisputable. He suggests “at skipat sé brotgeiranum, 
ok hafi hvárirtveggju at jafnaði; síðan sé þat lǫgtekit, at hverr eigi reka fyrir sinni jǫrðu” (32) 
[“that the bone of contention is divided equally between both sides; then it should be laid 
down by law that everyone owns the flotsam on his land”].  
In this way, a CPR is divided into smaller parts that become private property. It is 
possible to read this story as an example of Hardin’s tragedy of the commons: Joint use of the 
CPR becomes impossible when population increases and the resource base diminishes, even 
though the decrease in flotsam cannot be attributed to human overuse of the CPR in this case. 
While the CPR itself (unlike Hardin’s pasture) is not destroyed, privatization appears as the 
only solution. 
Following Ostrom, a different interpretation is possible. The problem was not that the 
beach, as a CPR, was unsustainable per se. After all, its use as a CPR worked well in Ǫnundr’s 
and Eirik’s time, with both sides seemingly being on friendly terms with each other. Conflict 
occurs only when the younger generation does not acknowledge their fathers’ arrangement. 
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The violent conflict could have been avoided had the two parties jointly developed rules for 
shared resource appropriation from the CPR. Such rules would have forestalled the ambiguity 
concerning ownership of the stranded whale and would have made privatization of the CPR 
unnecessary. In this view, a lack of clear rules and of cooperation between the appropriators 
is what leads to the ultimate failure of the CPR. 
What makes this case from Grettis saga different from all the other examples discussed 
so far is that the text does not indicate through any means that one conflicting party is in their 
right and the other is not. None of them is cast in a negative light. This makes this example the 
strongest case for a Hardin-based interpretation, according to which self-interest and egoism 
prevent CPRs from being sustainable, and privatization offers itself as an obvious solution.  
 
The island Drangey in Grettis saga 
 
This is different in another case of a failed CPR likewise included in Grettis saga: the 
island Drangey. This is at the same time the only example where a pasture managed as a CPR 
fails. The saga tells that on this uninhabited island, there were 80 sheep meant for slaughter 
and that birds’ eggs could be collected there by those who owned a share in the island: “Svá 
segja menn, at eigi ætti færi menn í eyjunni en tuttugu, ok vildi engi sinn part ǫðrum selja” 
(Grettis saga Ásmundarsonar 228) [“People say that no fewer than 20 people owned the island, 
and no one wanted to sell his share to another”]. This is certainly not to be understood as 
meaning that the island itself is divided into 20 separate parts, but rather that the number of 
animals each party can graze on it is adjusted according to the size of the share. Drangey thus 
constitutes a CPR that resembles the common mountain pastures. 
When the outlaw Grettir and his brother Illugi take refuge on Drangey, they refuse to let 
the farmers access the island, and they eat the animals kept there. Not being able to make use 
of Drangey any longer, the smallholders among the farmers offer their shares to Þorbjǫrn 
ǫngull, the brother of a local chieftain, on the condition that he will kill or remove Grettir from 
the island. In this way, Þorbjǫrn acquires “mikinn hlut eyjarinnar með litlu verði” (236) [“a 
large part of the island for a low price”]. Þorbjǫrn only manages to kill Grettir with the help of 
pagan sorcery, which is illegal at this time and leads to him being outlawed. However, 
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ownership of the island is not transferred back to the smallholders, but to Þorbjǫrn’s brother 
Hjalti.  
Drangey is thus transformed from a CPR to private property. It is a failed CPR, even 
though Grettir’s presence doesn’t lead to ecological degradation. He acts as a free rider, like 
the thieves causing trouble on common mountain pastures who unlawfully appropriate the 
farmers’ resource units. Unlike Hardin’s pasture, Drangey was obviously not “open to all”, 
but managed cooperatively by the farmers, with clear rules for its use. In an Ostrom-based 
reading, the failure of the CPR would thus mainly be attributed to the involvement of an 
external party acting as a free rider. 
However, the way the story is narrated suggests that it actually is Þorbjǫrn who is 
responsible for this outcome. The narrator describes him variously as “ódæll” (226) 
[“quarrelsome”], “illfengr ok ófyrirleitinn” (226) [“malicious and ruthless”], “óvinsæll” (236) 
[“unpopular”] and as “mestr óeirðarmaðr” (227) [“the greatest troublemaker”]. He takes 
advantage of the smallholders’ problematic situation to acquire their shares. His use of pagan 
magic to overcome Grettir casts him in an even more negative light.  
As Butler (2019) argues, even though what Grettir does is shown to be problematic, the 
narrator’s sympathies rest with him. Considering that Grettir had only a short time left before 
his outlawry would have ended, Þorbjǫrn could simply have waited until the problem solved 
itself. Instead, he acts egoistically and greedily in his privatizing of the CPR. His 
characterization in the saga and his later violent death through blood vengeance suggest that 
his behavior is to be considered wrong, and that cooperation with the other parties involved 
in the management of the CPR would have been preferred. 
 
The Social Function of Narratives of the Commons 
 
The CPRs in all the examples from the sagas discussed above appear either as vulnerable 
or as failing. It is striking that it is not a saga, but Íslendingabók alone that mentions an example 
of a successful CPR: the land at Þingvellir, which provides free access to pasture and firewood 
to the participants of the Alþingi (cf. Íslendingabók 8-9). According to Íslendingabók, this CPR 
has emerged through the transformation of privately owned land into common property. 
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Considering that the Alþingi was the most important legal and judicial institution in the 
Icelandic Free State and that it figures as an important setting in many of the sagas of 
Icelanders, it may appear strange that this case of an apparently uncontested and long-term 
successful CPR is not narrated in more detail in any of the sagas. 
The sagas’ many stories about conflicts concerning CPRs certainly have contributed to 
creating the view among scholars that pre-modern Icelanders lived in a “competitive society 
oriented to private property” (Byock, 2001, p. 57), as Jesse Byock expresses it, drawing 
conclusions from the medieval sagas about real-world Iceland in the Viking Age. William Ian 
Miller, who like Byock sees the sagas as relatively reliable sources concerning Iceland’s social 
history, likewise assumes a strong tendency towards private ownership in early Icelandic 
society. Based on some CPR conflicts in the sagas, he claims that “shared ownership of 
property interests by people of different households was fertile ground for dispute” (Miller, 
1990, p. 131). He seems thus to follow Hardin’s assumption of an inevitable “tragedy of the 
commons” that suggests privatization as a solution.  
However, it can be problematic to draw direct conclusions from the sagas’ accounts of 
CPR conflicts about the social reality of pre-modern Iceland, such as Byock and Miller do. One 
explanation for why the sagas do not tell any stories about successful CPRs may be narrative 
need: well-functioning long-term cooperation between CPR users doesn’t provide as much 
storytelling material as violent resource conflicts do. Also, there is little historical evidence that 
CPRs indeed were less sustainable than private property. Economic historian Thráinn 
Eggertsson, for example, argues that the common mountain pastures in Iceland constituted a 
“relatively efficient resource system” (1992, p. 436) that had considerable advantages for its 
users. Recent research at lake Mývatn in northern Iceland has documented how waterfowl 
there were managed sustainably as a CPR for more than a millenium (Hicks et al., 2019). 
Environmental historian Richard Hoffmann likewise emphasizes that historical material from 
medieval Europe provides little support for Hardin’s “tragedy” and that it is not possible to 
conclude that management of resources as private property was more sustainable than CPRs 
(Hoffmann, 2014, p. 247-263). And, as the case of Þingvellir indicates, CPRs that were 
undisputed and (relatively) successful in the long term seem to have existed and indeed 
played a very important role for the functioning of pre-modern Icelandic society.  
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But why, then, would Icelanders in the 13th and 14th centuries tell so many stories about 
vulnerable and failed CPRs set in a period several hundred years in the past? The answer must 
be that these stories were regarded as having some kind of relevance for the present – that is, 
for the time when the sagas were composed. As Jan Assmann emphasizes in his influential 
study of cultural memory, the past is never remembered for its own sake (Assmann, 2013, p. 
75), and the way in which it is reconstructed (and narrated) is always guided by the hopes and 
reference frames of the present in question (p. 88). Literary texts contribute to the construction 
of cultural memory through, amongst other things, the establishing of collective identities and 
the “conceiving of shared values and norms” (Erll and Nünning, 2005, p. 275). This is clearly 
the case in the sagas of Icelanders, which deliver narratives about the founding of Icelandic 
society and in this way, as Pernille Hermann expresses it, create “a vision of continuity 
between present and past, constructed in literature, for the real-life audience, i.e. readers and 
most likely very often listeners, to relate itself to” (Hermann, 2010, p. 82). 
The question is, then, what sort of values and norms the sagas convey to their audiences 
concerning CPR use for these audiences’ own present. The ten examples of stories about CPRs 
analyzed in this article all show these resources systems to be vulnerable or failing. However, 
only the case of the beach in Grettis saga can be read as support for Hardin’s “tragic” narrative, 
in which the resource’s status as a CPR appears as unsustainable per se and privatization as 
the preferred alternative. This is at the same time the only example that does not come with a 
negative characterization of any of the parties involved in the failure of a CPR. In the nine 
remaining cases, the characterization of the involved parties suggests that such failure is 
neither desirable nor inevitable. Those who endanger or terminate a CPR are in four cases 
explicitly characterized as ójafnaðarmenn [“overbearing men”] and are associated with ójafnaðr 
[“injustice”] in two more cases. In the three remaining cases, similar negative characteristics 
based on other terms are described. In all these nine cases, it is those who are characterized in 
such negative ways who, through aggressive and antisocial behavior, threaten the CPRs in 
question – never the other parties involved.  
In this way, the sagas provide rather clear guidelines to how the narrated resource 
conflicts are to be interpreted by their audiences. As Vésteinn Ólason remarks, “[a]rrogance 
and aggression are always shown to be wrong” (1998, p. 144) in the sagas. Modesty and 





SCANDIA: JOURNAL OF MEDIEVAL NORSE STUDIES N. 3, 2020 (ISSN: 2595-9107) 
                                                                                                                                                                              60 
 
cooperation, in contrast, figure as an often implicit and sometimes explicit ideal in almost all 
the stories about CPR use analyzed in this article. This is nowhere as clearly expressed as in 
Laxdœla saga’s description of the fishing place at Bjarneyjar, which explicitly emphasizes 
peaceful cooperation as a social norm for the users of this large-scale CPR, even though it 
appears to be “open to all” (and thus according to Hardin would inevitably fail). In the sagas, 
the basic requirement for successful CPRs is not even the existence of clear rules (as Ostrom 
would claim), but that all involved parties practice modesty and demonstrate willingness to 
cooperate.  
In a recent volume on contemporary novels and films about climate change, the editors 
argue that such “[s]tories are forms of collective sense-making with the capacity to motivate 
and mobilize readers. […] They do this above all through textual cues which invite readers to 
inhabit a particular point of view” (Goodbody and Johns-Putra, 2019, p. 7). The hope 
connected with such “climate-change fiction” is that it will encourage its audiences to take 
appropriate action in their own present to fight global warming. The analyses presented above 
suggest that the stories about CPR use in the sagas had a similar function for their medieval 
audiences: to promote behavior that could lead to long-term sustainability in the managing of 
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